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A commentary on
Future Morphology? Summary of visual
word identificationeffects draws attention
to necessary efforts in understanding
morphological processing
by Koester, D. (2012). Front. Psychology
3:395. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00395
In an effort to define more precisely
what we currently know about early steps
in the visual identification of complex
words, we recently published a review of
morphological effects in lexical decision,
unmasked priming and masked priming
studies (Amenta and Crepaldi, 2012). The
review aims at identifying a set of well-
established experimental effects that any
theory in the field should be able to
explain, so as to allow for a more rig-
orous adjudication process to take place
and for the field to progress incremen-
tally toward more and more explana-
tory power (Grainger and Jacobs, 1996;
Coltheart et al., 2001). We called this set
of experimental effects “the target list”
(Amenta and Crepaldi, 2012, p. 9). Shortly
afterwards, Koester (2012) published a
commentary that highlights a set of open
issues concerning our paper, which we try
to address here. The questions raised by
Koester (2012) are all well motivated, and
their answer strongly influence how the
target list is going to be used in future
research; for this reason, it is important
to address Koester’s questions in a timely
manner and, in doing so, to specify more
clearly why we believe that the target list is
important for the field, and how it should
be used. Importantly, althoughwe strongly
advocated in our original paper for cog-
nitive theories to become computational
models, Koester’s points apply more gen-
erally to any kind of cognitive theory,
either computational or descriptive; our
replies will thus try to stand at that gen-
eral level, which stresses the generality and
importance of the issues highlighted by
Koester (2012).
The first issue raised by Koester (2012)
speaks as follows in his own words:
“Amenta and Crepaldi’s review points
toward relevant linguistic . . . and psy-
cholinguistics variables . . . and their
relations regarding visual word identi-
fication. . . . . The authors suggest that
these findings provide a basis for the
evaluation of competing theories and, in
doing so, to contribute to future the-
ory development; in their own words,
to construct an “all-inclusive model of
visual identification of complex words”.
In light of the specificity of the insights,
these broad suggestions leave the reader
with the impression of a gap between
insights and suggestions.” (p. 1, 2nd col-
umn, 2nd paragraph)
Koester (2012) seems to question that
focusing on very specific experimental
effects might drive to enlarge the generality
of our theories. We suspect that the exact
definition of “generality” is the key point
here. If a theory is general when it sur-
passes the boundaries of the field where it
was developed (e.g., it is possibly insight-
ful for spoken word identification while
it was developed to explain reading data),
then Koester is right that focusing on
small-scale, specific effects would not help.
But if generality is conceived as explana-
tory power, i.e., a theory is more general
than another when it explains more data,
then assessing theories on how many rel-
evant experimental effects they are able
to explain clearly encourages the develop-
ment of general models. We acknowledge
that it would be desirable to have gen-
eral theories in the sense endorsed by the
former approach. However, “cross-field”
generality normally comes at some cost in
terms of model under-specification, and
current morphological theories lack in
details under so many points of view that
this is probably a cost we cannot afford
at the moment. Theories are useful in the
first place because they generate testable
predictions; the less they are specified, the
less likely they will be to generate predic-
tions of this kind.
The second point highlighted by
Koester (2012) concerns the role of some
variables that are well-established factors
in reading, which we left unaddressed in
our review
“such as surface frequency, word length,
word class, abstractness, or cues to mor-
pheme boundaries.” (p. 1, 3rd column,
1st paragraph)
Of course, Koester is right that these
variables are very relevant in the exist-
ing literature on visual word identification;
however, it is difficult to envisage a specific
role for them in theories that focus on mor-
phology. Apart from cues to morphemic
boundaries—whose effect, however, has
never been demonstrated unambiguously,
i.e., we do not know about any study
where these variables were manipulated
independently of any other—, these factors
are not morphological in nature, and so
whether or not any model of visual com-
plex word identification will be able to
account for them depends on aspects of
the theory that have nothing to do with
morphemes. Possibly, surface frequency
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might be relevant for the morphologi-
cal aspects of a theory of visual word
identification by virtue of its relationship
with stem frequency. Indeed, stem and
surface frequency were shown to interact
in complex word processing (e.g., Baayen
et al., 2007). This issue was covered in
Amenta and Crepaldi (2012, p. 2).
A third big issue raised by Koester
(2012) concerns
“how the neural evidence is to be incor-
porated into a strictly cognitive model.”
(p. 1, 3rd column, 2nd paragraph)
There are two levels, we believe, at
which this issue needs to be addressed.
In terms of assessing the explanatory ade-
quacy of cognitive theories, i.e., which
experimental data any model should be
tested against, there seems to be little
role for brain data (e.g., fMRI and ERP).
Of course, cognitive neuropsychology has
indeed proven decisive to inform the
structure of cognitive models (and reading
models in particular), and often it has pro-
vided evidence for theoretical claims in a
way that is unrivalled by other disciplines
for elegance and simplicity (e.g., Coltheart,
1982; Coslett and Saffran, 1989; Luzzatti
et al., 2001). However, this evidence was
always behavioral in nature—essentially,
response time, and accuracy—, because
this is what maps onto the predictions
that purely cognitive models can make.
In fact, existing cognitive theories of
how we identify printed complex words
make no explicit statement on the brain
structures that underlie the system and
on how these structures work (e.g., Taft
and Ardasinski, 2006; Gonnerman et al.,
2007; Crepaldi et al., 2010; Baayen et al.,
2011; Grainger and Ziegler, 2011). Thus,
they make no predictions on brain data.
This is true more in general for all
existing computational models of read-
ing (e.g., Coltheart et al., 2001; Norris,
2006; Davis, 2010): they have no way to
model neural responses such as, e.g., ERPs
or BOLD signal, and consequently they
should not be evaluated on these grounds.
Here the second, more general level
at which this issue should be addressed
comes about: why is this the case? There
seems to be no principled reason behind
this fact. Indeed, one would just need
some function to link mental computa-
tions (of whatever kind) to the activity of
brain units (of whatever size, from single
neurons to cortical areas) in order to pro-
duce quantitative predictions about neural
responses on the basis of some kind of
cognitive model. The problem is exactly
that this link function has been proven
extremely difficult to find. Typically, this
was related to the idea that the brain
uses distributed representations, i.e., even
simple concepts/mental objects such as
individual words or individual letters are
represented through a pattern of activation
over an indefinite number of brain units,
i.e., neurons or small clusters of neurons
(e.g., McClelland et al., 1986; Young and
Yamane, 1993; O’Reilly, 1998; McClelland,
2001). Because we do not know the exact
dynamics that govern these units, where
they would be localized in the brain with
respect to each other, and so on, it is
virtually impossible to draw any straight
and well-defined connection, such as those
required to generate clear predictions,
between mental units and neural units.
Indeed, some studies have challenged the
idea of distributed representations and
have stood in defense of the so-called
grandmother cells (e.g., Quiroga et al.,
2005; Bowers, 2009). This would point to
an easy, one-to-one link function between
mental and brain units; but then one needs
to consider that (1) most grandmother
cell studies have also highlighted mas-
sive redundancy in single-cell coding, i.e.,
there might be many cells coding for, e.g.,
the word sofa (e.g., Waydo et al., 2006);
(2) we have no idea on where exactly to
expect each relevant cell to be localized
in the brain; and (3) widespread imag-
ing techniques are currently far away from
recording the activity of single neurons, or
small clusters of neurons. Although there
are signs that this latter problem might
be overcome in a reasonably close future
(e.g., Sahin et al., 2009), at least the former
two points make clear that even hypoth-
esizing a one-to-one mapping between
mind and brain units would hardly be of
any help in deriving testable predictions on
neural data from (computational) mod-
els of cognition. Of course, one-to-one
mapping between cognitive and bran units
could logically emerge at higher levels of
complexity, i.e., between mental processes
and cortical areas, rather than between
individual representations and single cells.
However, experimental data indicate that
this is not the case: there seems to be
no single brain area that could be held
responsible for one single mental opera-
tion, and even considering smaller sets of
neurons, such as those tracked by cortical
stimulation in awake patients, most brain
units take part in different cognitive pro-
cesses (e.g., Roux et al., 2012). These con-
siderations all drive to think that not only
existing cognitive models of visual word
identification take no stance as to their
neural substrates, but also that this would
be far from our grasp, given what we cur-
rently know. It is important to stress that
this is not even close to suggesting that
brain data bear no relevance for cogni-
tive theories. What we are saying is, more
modestly, that neural effects should not be
included into a list of to-be-explained facts
because we do not know how exactly cog-
nitive and brain units map into each other,
and thus we cannot derive exact predic-
tions on brain data on the basis of purely
cognitive models.
A final important point raised by
Koester (2012) concerns the fact that our
target list
“comprises aspects of experimental tech-
niques (masking)” (p. 2, 1st column, 2nd
paragraph)
which is questionable because
“Masking does not pertain to the phe-
nomenon in question.” (p. 2, 1st col-
umn, 2nd paragraph)
Of course we agree with Koester (2012)
that task-related aspects do not belong
to the domain of morphology. However,
they do make a difference for morpho-
logical effects. For example, corner is an
effective prime for corn only when it is pre-
sented in a masked form (e.g., Rastle et al.,
2000). Or again, brother—when compared
to brothel—makes it easier to identify broth
in lexical decision (Rastle et al., 2004), but
not in a same-different task (Duñabeitia
et al., 2011) or in a semantic task (Marelli
et al., in press). If a theory refuses to take a
position as to how readers carry out these
different tasks, what should it account for
in these cases? Should it care to explain
why corner facilitates corn, or rather why
corner does not facilitate corn? It is clear
that experimental effects only make sense
in context, i.e., in specific tasks, because
they always emerge in specific tasks. This
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is why we included aspects of experimen-
tal techniques in our target list, of course
limiting ourselves to those aspects that
modulate morphological effects.
In conclusion, we thank Koester (2012)
for raising these issues, thus giving us the
possibility to clarify our opinion where
perhaps we were not clear enough in our
original paper. We hope that the notes
illustrated in this article will help readers
to better understand the sense of our pro-
posal of a target list, and to use this list
properly so as to advance our knowledge
on how human readers identify printed
complex words in a more cooperative and
incremental fashion.
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